Transformation of DHS Intelligence Unit Falls Short of Fundamental Change
Over the past two years, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) chief intelligence office, known for its practices under scrutiny for politicization and toxic culture, has attempted a comprehensive overhaul. This initiative, termed a “360 review,” included structural realignments and evaluations of operational priorities. It concluded with a 228-page policy manual released during the Biden administration, intended to guide the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). Despite these efforts, concerns about potential misuse of powers persist.
The I&A’s ambiguous domestic intelligence operations continue to lack comprehensive oversight, raising alarms about potential abuse. Despite calls from conservative groups, such as Project 2025, to dismantle the agency, legislative action to bring about major changes is unlikely in the current political climate. Particularly troubling are the risks associated with I&A in light of former President Donald Trump’s pledged actions against dissenters.
The agency’s past activities include the targeting of protestors and journalists during racial justice demonstrations and classifying the vandalism of confederate monuments as a national security threat. I&A continues to monitor social media discussions on sensitive topics, distributing this intelligence to law enforcement nationwide.
A former DHS intelligence attorney, now with the Brennan Center for Justice, has documented the ongoing issues within I&A, advocating for substantive reform. Despite legislative efforts from Congress, loopholes remain, leaving the agency with a “vague mandate.”
Recent reforms within I&A include procedures for documenting intelligence activities. Although a step in the right direction, the expansive legal authorities remain, allowing continued misuse of counterterrorism powers. Investigations have highlighted I&A’s targeting of environmental activists, echoing the agency’s 2020 operations in Portland. The new policy offers minimal protection against future misuses.
These internal reforms highlight the instability of voluntary changes, as illustrated by the Biden administration’s retraction and subsequent alteration of the guidebook following a new executive order from the Trump administration. This illustrates how quickly internal reforms can be undone.
Challenges in Oversight and Internal Procedures
The 2025 policy manual requires documentation and justification of intelligence operations, but details of this documentation remain withheld from the public, compromising transparency. Officers must create “reasonable belief statements,” though the standard set for these is seen as lenient, allowing broad discretion.
The manual references 2017 guidelines, which allow targeting First Amendment-protected activities under the guise of broader missions. Additionally, I&A has added hate crimes to its mission, although the legal basis for this remains unclear. The risk of pretextual targeting is noted but inadequately addressed in the guidance.
Moreover, recent intelligence reports reflect ongoing issues, suggesting potential unrest from discussions on divisive topics, which could lead to biased targeting. Past incidents have shown the impact of such practices, highlighting the need for change.
Controversial Appointments and Questionable Practices
I&A’s staffing includes key figures from the CIA, raising concerns about their suitability given the CIA’s historical issues. The person responsible for managing relationships with local police has a background in a criticized Boston agency, potentially exacerbating local law enforcement issues.
The oversight division within I&A, although promoted, remains limited in effectiveness due to its subordinate position. Acknowledging this, the policy manual states that oversight does not cover other DHS intelligence programs, leaving areas like Customs and Border Protection initiatives unchecked.
Future Directions and Legislative Considerations
Under its current strategy, I&A has engaged with police agencies along the southwest border, potentially influencing immigration enforcement. While some may support these actions, they raise concerns about the treatment of migrants and potential targeting of aid groups.
For meaningful change, Congress should consider redistributing I&A’s functions to other agencies, focusing on areas with high risk and limited value. There is a pressing need for a comprehensive intelligence oversight program within DHS, as outlined by the Brennan Center, to address these enduring issues.
